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mainstream psychology (Gilbert, 1998), psychoanalysis (Broucek,
1982; Chasseguet-Smirgel, 1985; Kingston, 1983; Rizzuto, 1991) and
sociology (Giddens, 1991; Vogler, 2000). Despite this growth, there are
difficulties in studying shame within traditional disciplinary contexts.
It will be argued here that shame needs to be understood as a psycho-
social concept. It is paradoxically a very intimate and private emotion,
yet is also hard to conceive of without the external world: an essential
aspect of shame is the feeling of being judged by a real or imagined
other. The study of shame has been beset by difficulties of definition
and methodological problems that are arguably connected to this
mercurial and paradoxical nature of shame: hidden, private and yet
inconceivable without culture (Heller 1985). 
I came by an interest in shame through carrying out interviews with
people who had a family member suffer from serious mental illness.
Shame was not something I was looking for when I started. I was inter-
ested, however, in ‘stigma’, as the ‘outward’ mark of difference
(Goffman, 1963). This was an issue that has been thoroughly explored
in relation to those who have been diagnosed as suffering from mental
illness themselves (Scheff, 1975 for example). There were good grounds
for thinking that families would experience stigma (Wahl and Harman,
1989) which would be significant in that it might well inhibit them
from seeking help and support. I found, however, that this stigma was
more complex – for one thing it was difficult to get people to talk about.
This obstacle to communication pointed the way to the affect of stigma
– shame. Two particular issues will be dealt with in this paper: the
methodological difficulties of studying shame and the impact that
shaming experiences can have on people’s sense of identity which
might well provide some explanation for the commonly observed
phenomenon of ‘chronic grief ’.
Relatives and Mental Illness: Chronic Grief
Many writers and researchers have now drawn attention to the appar-
ently difficult bereavement process that relatives of people with severe
mental health problems are involved in (Atkinson, 1994; Creer, 1975;
Davis and Shutz, 1997; Lanquetot, 1988; Macgreggor, 1994; Spaniol,
Zipple and Lockwood, 1992; Wasow, 1995). A number of explanations
have been put forward to explain why this grief should be so difficult
to move through. Davis and Schultz suggest that the presence of
‘reminders of loss, or the discrepancy between “the world that is with
the world that should be” (Parkes, 1988:5) were blatant and frequent’
shame and loss 69
Shame and Loss
narrative and identity in families
with a member suffering from
mental illness
David W Jones
T his paper investigates the impact that shame can have on people’s senseof identity and how this can be a major factor in exacerbating feelingsof loss. Whilst acknowledging the considerable contemporary theoret-
ical interest in the affect of shame, attention is drawn to the methodological
difficulties inherent in studying shame. It is argued that shame is an important
aspect of human experience but is one that provides a challenge not only to
quantitative methods, but also to conventional qualitative methods of enquiry.
A methodology based on psychodynamically-informed interviews and analysis
is therefore utilised. 
Extracts of interviews with families (drawn from a larger study of the
impact of serious mental illness on families) are used to argue that the shame
of having a family member suffer from mental illness can very directly threaten
people’s sense of identity. Shame, it will be argued, helps us understand the
well-recognised phenomenon of ‘chronic grieving’ amongst relatives of people
with severe mental health problems. Shame keeps people out of the dialogue
with others through which new narratives of self might be developed.
Theoretical links between this construct of shame and chronic grieving can be
made with observations of the associations between shame and depression. 
Introduction
This paper is concerned with reaching a better understanding of
people’s experiences of shame. After many years of neglect, the past two
to three decades have witnessed an upsurge of interest in shame within
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tional psychoanalytic accounts of the ego-ideal, agreeing that it is
formed in large part through identifications with parental objects.
They go further than this and suggest that the ego-ideal is far more
adaptable and open to much later influences. Identifications with
siblings and peer groups are likely to have a part in the continuing
formation of the ego-ideal. There are definite parallels here with more
sociological and social psychological notions of identity that stress the
importance of social interaction in the constant construction of
selfhood (Berger and Luckman, 1967; Bruner, 1990; Harré, 1998).
Indeed there are now many converging theoretical constructs empha-
sising the central importance of interaction to the development of
self-hood. Daniel Stern’s (1998) meticulous work on child develop-
ment emphasises the dialogic nature of non-verbal interaction
between parents and very young infants – arguing that these interac-
tions are vital to the development of an individual sense of self. As the
child matures and develops the capacity for language, verbal interac-
tions will build ‘a sense of verbal self ’. There is now growing
theoretical interest in the importance of dialogue and narrative in the
construction of selfhood (Gregg, 1995; Hermans, Rijks and Kempen,
1993; Lysaker and Lysaker, 2001). Wyatt (1986) and Schafer (1992)
suggest that the therapeutic efficacy of psychoanalysis is through its
ability to support the patient through refashioning their own personal
narratives in ways that help them experience a more coherent sense of
themselves (see McLeod, 1997 for a review of the use of narrative
approaches in a range of psychotherapy schools). 
If shame disrupts interaction and dialogue then it seems likely that
it will interrupt the process through which people can continue to
refashion their sense of self. Anthony Giddens suggested something
similar in arguing that shame threatens identity because it ‘is essen-
tially anxiety about the adequacy of the narrative by means of which
the individual sustains a coherent biography’ (Giddens, 1991: 65). A
plausible explanation for these relatives becoming stuck in experiences
of chronic grief may be the impact of shame on their interactions with
others. If interaction occurs it may allow people’s sense of themselves
and their relationship to the ‘ill’ family member to grow and change. I
will argue that there was evidence during the interviews of shame
inhibiting the dialogue that could update the narrative of people’s
lives. It is this link between shame and the ability to update and
refashion ourselves that suggests more general links between experi-
ences of shame and depression.
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(1997:375). It has also been argued that feelings of guilt will inhibit the
grieving process, as people may feel they do not deserve to get over it
(MacGregor, 1994). This also might be an example of what MacGregor
(1994) refers to as ‘disenfranchised grief ’; that is grief that is not under-
stood or acknowledged by the wider community. Whilst these factors
no doubt have some relevance, the case will be made that feelings of
shame can inhibit the dialogue that can be so important to people in
‘updating’ the narrative of their lives and assisting them to find new
meaning in the post-loss circumstances.
Conceptualizing Shame
Despite the growing interest in shame, this is an area still dogged by
major conceptual differences between theorists (see Gilbert, 1998, and
Pattison, 2000, for reviews). No attempt will be made to address these
differences here, since it may well be that, as Pattison (2000:39) argues
‘approaches to shame are mostly disparate and incommensurable’. I
suggest that part of the difficulty is due to the longstanding divide
between the ‘social’ and ‘psychological’ academic disciplines. Shame
needs to be understood as belonging to neither one nor the other, but
can only be understood within the context of an interaction of both. 
For the purposes of this paper, shame is defined as the painful and
aversive feeling that follows as someone judges that their own self is
being, or will be, judged as unacceptable. Piers and Singer (1953/1971)
produced an early formulation of shame, many of the themes of which
have been developed in more recent psychoanalytic accounts
(Broucek, 1982; Chasseguet-Smirgel, 1985; Kingston, 1983; Rizzuto,
1991) and biological approaches (Gilbert and Mcguire, 1998). This
formulation provides a link between the often hidden and intimate
emotion of shame and wider cultural processes. Piers and Singer drew
a distinction between guilt and shame in psychoanalytic terms. They
saw guilt being produced from tension ‘between ego and super-ego’
whilst shame arose from ‘tension between the ego and the ego-ideal’.
The distinction between ego-ideal and super-ego was not made by
Freud, but by others since then (see Chasseguet-Smirgel, 1985 for
review). Guilt, according to Piers and Singer, resulted from a
perceived transgression of some internalised behavioural boundary,
whereas shame came when a person feels that they are being found
wanting in comparison to their own idealised self. Piers and Singer’s
view of the role of the ego-ideal in the life of shame throws light on
these relatives’ experiences. Piers and Singer are consistent with tradi-
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qualitative in-depth interviews with families. The methodology
utilizes principles from traditional qualitative interviewing alongside
assumptions, drawn from psychodynamic theory that significant
aspects of people’s experiences may not be expressed directly (Hollway
and Jefferson, 2000; Jones, 1998). 
Method
Two different means of identifying potential participants in an urban
area of North London in the UK were used – 
i) Relatives of people who had been admitted to a psychiatric unit for a
continuous period of at least six months in the past 2 years. 
ii) Relatives of another group consisting of a random sample of people
referred to a Community Psychiatrist. The grounds for including this
group were that a decision had been made somewhere that these were
people who would be requiring long-term support.
In both groups, participants were from families of people who had at
some time received a diagnosis of schizophrenia, or bipolar affective
disorder who were below the age of 55, and were not being resettled as
part of the reprovision programme.2 Thirty-four families were inter-
viewed. In terms of ethnicity, they reflected the multicultural area of
North London in which the study was based (King et al. 1994). Over
half the samples were from an ethnic minority, mainly of African-
Caribbean origin. Most of the interviewees were parents, but siblings
were also interviewed. 
Relatives were interviewed usually in their own homes. The
purposes of the study were explained: I was being funded by the Health
Authority and I was interested in the families of people who used the
psychiatric services, as I felt that the involvement and responsibility
taken by families was not always recognised by professionals and
service planners. People were given an assurance about confidentiality;
that if I used something they said to illustrate a point I would not use
their real name, and that identities would be disguised. If people agreed
to take part, I then asked if they would mind being tape-recorded.
Interviews were typically around 1.5 hours long, with a range between
45 minutes and 2 hours.
In-depth, relatively unstructured, interviews were the chosen
method of investigation. There are two major methodological strands
to the study. Firstly I wanted to try and understand the perspectives
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Shame, Chronic Grief and Depression 
Whilst the links between shame and depression remain the source of
some debate (Sloman, 2000; MacDonald and Morley, 2001), correla-
tions between depressive symptoms and self-reports of shame have
consistently been found (Tangney, 1993 for example). Andrews, Qian
and Valentine (2002) suggest that shame may have a causal role in
depression.1 Scheff (2001) argues that the roots of depression lie in a
lack of secure social bonds and that shame is like an alarm ‘a response
to threatened or severed bonds’ (Scheff, 2001:218). I will argue here
that there may well often be a link between shame and depression. This
link can be better understood in terms of the role that shame plays in
stifling the dialogue, which can be necessary to the creation of new
meanings that may help an individual find their way out of depression. 
The proposition here is that people’s sense of selfhood is dependent
on them having a narrative of that self that needs to develop and
change. I will argue that Giddens (1991) is right to identify shame as
causing a rupture in this process since shame leads people to withdraw
from dialogue and interaction with others which is a crucial mecha-
nism through which the narrative of the self can be developed. This
formulation offers a helpful way of understanding certain psycholog-
ical aspects of the experiences of those who have suffered shame
amidst loss. 
The Methodological Challenge of Shame
Despite the growth in interest in the affect of shame, the empirical
study of shame still provides major methodological challenges. It is
difficult to study since, as many commentators have observed, one of
its chief manifestations is to make people withdraw from social connec-
tion and dialogue (Tantam, 1998) and to avoid discussing those aspects
of life that were experienced as shameful (MacDonald and Morley,
2001; MacDonald, 1998; Merrell, 1958). It is part of the argument here
that people who have a family member suffering from serious mental
illness are very likely to be ashamed, but may have great trouble
discussing those feelings. Shame often seemed to emerge in quite
covert ways during interviews with families about their experiences of
living with mental illness. It was in the dynamic space of the interview
itself where the shape of shame could be felt, and in the ostensible
breaks in communication that shame could be heard. It is therefore
important that methodological techniques that are able to apprehend
such communications are explored. This study uses data gathered from
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kind of a blockage in the analyst where he/she was failing to under-
stand the unconscious communication of the patient. This blockage
was construed as some neurotic reaction within the analyst that
suggested the analyst needed further psychoanalysis. Since Freud’s
original use in 1910 the concept of counter-transference has been
refined and developed particularly by the British school of object rela-
tions (Bollas, 1987; Kohon, 1986; Raynor, 1990). Paula Heimann’s
(1950) paper was seminal in drawing attention to the communicative
aspects of counter-transference. By careful and critical monitoring of
their own feelings evoked in the analytic setting an analyst may gain
useful insight into the unconscious dynamics taking place and there-
fore into the internal world of the patient. Samuels (1993) suggests
that it is through this notion of counter-transference that depth
psychology might make its greatest contribution to political and social
analysis. Counter-transference feelings represent a point of contact
between the analyst/researcher and the subject of research. This
notion was particularly useful in this study in throwing light on one
mother’s experience of shame, as will be discussed later.3
Certain discrete topics such as people’s views on medication or
direct experiences of stigma were initially explored through a system-
atic process. All mentions of the topic were gathered together. All
extracts could then be compared and themes developed from them
rather in the manner of grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967).
Other issues, however, emerged from what I am calling integrative
analysis. Here, no meaningful distinction can be made between the
process of data collection and data analysis. The ideas about the signif-
icance of shame came partly from experiences within, and reflections
upon, the interviews themselves. These ideas developed further
through reading and discussion with others. The results of these
processes are subjective interpretations of the interview material. This
clearly poses a challenge for judging the reliability and validity of the
findings. In an attempt to address these concerns I have tried to use
quite long quotations from interviews, and use a system of numeric
notation to show why I am making those interpretations. Numbers
appearing in the text refer to the interview material below. 
It is worth noting that I am deliberately drawing an artificial
boundary around the psycho-social space in order to make some partic-
ular points about the significance of the impact of shame. Many issues
could be brought up to explain why particular individuals experience
shame – notably concerning people’s biographies and social factors
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and experiences of the families. In this, I was influenced by a strong
tradition of phenomenologically informed qualitative research which
developed originally in sociology (Bogdan and Taylor, 1975; Glaser and
Strauss, 1967; Schutz, 1954/1967; Silverman, 1985), the themes of
which are to be found in more recent work in psychology (Harré, 1981;
Hollway, 1989; Potter and Wetherell, 1987 and Smith, Jarman and
Osborn, 1999). There have been, however, well recorded difficulties
with including the emotional worlds of individuals within the findings
of this tradition of qualitative research (as discussed by Craib, 1995;
Kleinman, and Copp, 1993; Oakley, 1981; O’Connell and Laydor, 1994
for example). The difficulty perhaps emerges because the emotional
issues are not necessarily manifest in the transcripts of interviews or in
the overt behaviour of the people studied. Since I was particularly
interested in examining the emotional impacts and understandings of
events it was also necessary to utilise ideas with roots in psychody-
namic thought (Hollway and Jefferson, 2000; Hunt, 1989; Jones, 1998).
Simply put, these were based on the understanding that a research
interview is an event that entails communications occurring at covert
and emotional levels.
The interviews and the analysis
A number of techniques can be employed in a research setting which
are based on ‘the assumption of association’ (Jones, 1998), techniques
that draw on the psychoanalytic concept of free association (Sandler,
Dare and Holder, 1973). In other words, the assumption is made that
the language people use and the connections that people make
between topics can be taken as indicating the emotional significance
and meaning of experiences for people in ways that they may not
themselves be able to express. This implies paying particular attention
to what people bring spontaneously to an interview; what words and
thoughts are associated together; or what tone, facial expression, or
posture is used that may suggest an alternative to the overtly intended
meaning. The emphasis on the communication of emotional states
demands that researchers be able to monitor their own emotional reac-
tions during interviews, since such non-verbal communication often
takes place on such a level. Such monitoring has been referred to, in
social research, as reflexivity (Kleinman and Copp, 1993) or as
counter-transference in the psychoanalytic literature. Counter-trans-
ference can broadly be defined as the experiences of the analyst that
occur in the presence of the patient. It was originally seen as some
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responsive?’ (3) OK they have a lot on their plates, that’s how I justify
some of their actions but I just . . .
As the interview continued, the meaning of the strong language (4)
with its suggestion of humiliation (and so perhaps with shame)
becomes clearer. Jason actually swore only on these two occasions (in
the excerpt above and below) when he was describing his feelings about
talking about his brother’s difficulties.4 Jason described himself as
becoming reluctant to confide in others because he would be revealing
something that others might find unacceptable. Jason is aware of a
dilemma here in that in cutting himself off from people he may be less
able to help his brother this time (5):
DJ: Have you had people that you can talk to, turn to for support?
JM: Er . . . Friends, immediate friends. But even then after a while you don’t
want to encroach on their privacy, you don’t want to take them for
granted. And furthermore they begin to feel “I’ve heard this crap before”
(4). And also I don’t particularly want to go to people to relate this same
thing year in year out “Oh another crisis in the family”, this type of
thing; I mean people get fed up. And this time, as I said, I’m going
through my own personal sort of problems as well, in terms of marriage
and divorce etcetera . . . And I’ve cut myself off from lots of people. I’ve
fewer people to relate to this time now, at that level (5). And I think that’s
probably why this time I’m not even taking this illness on board.
When I asked Jason directly about his feelings of embarrassment he
articulated concerns about his identity being damaged. He assumes that
people will perceive that his ‘image’ (6, 8) is flawed if people know about
his brother. Jason feels that people will see traces of his brother in him
(7), there is a stumble over words at this point emphasising the doubt
about where the precise boundary between himself and his brother lies.
If his brother has weaknesses, then so must he ‘deep down’ (9):
DJ: You mentioned feeling embarrassed before, is it something you have
difficulty talking about to some people, you try and hide it?
JM: Yes I think [in] the majority of cases, people who have a similar problem
are embarrassed to talk about it . . . [edit]. . Yes it is embarrassing I don’t
like talking about it especially to people I don’t know very well. And also
we all project a certain image (6) out there and once people will connect
that flaw with you, they have a certain perception of you. I think some
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such as gender and ethnicity. This study is focused on the impact that
shame itself can have. 
Extracts from three different interviews will be introduced and
explored. The first will be used to make the case for understanding
relatives’ experiences of stigmatization in terms of the emotion of
shame. The interview illustrates the very direct impact that shaming
experiences can have on people’s sense of identities. The second
example will illustrate how one common manifestation of shame is to
make people withdraw from dialogue. This withdrawal from dialogue,
it will be argued, has made it very difficult for this particular mother to
find new meanings that could accommodate the losses she has experi-
enced. She is stuck in ‘chronic grief ’. The third example is of a family
that appears to have been able to maintain a dialogue amongst each
other, including the person suffering mental illness. They have been
able to talk about both the experiences of stigma and of loss. This
capacity was manifest in the interview. This dialogue has allowed the
narrative of their lives, and their sense of themselves to develop. The
loss they feel through having one of their number suffer from mental
illness is not denied, but becomes part of the narrative through which
they are able to understand themselves and their identities. 
1. Stigma, Shame and Identity
Jason Manula was an interviewee who was able to offer useful insight
into the links between stigmatisation and psychological processes of
shaming. Jason had a brother who had a long history of psychiatric
hospitalisation with a diagnosis of bipolar affective disorder. At one
point Jason described going to the hospital to talk to staff about what
was going on in order to garner support (1). He used very strong
language (2), to describe his frustration that even though he has
made revelations about himself and his family, there was no real
response (3): 
DJ: Do doctors and other people talk to you about what they think? 
JM: Do the doctors? No, not at all. No they don’t … you’re the first person
who has spoken to me about this, and normally when I have taken him
to a hospital I have really tried to explain what it’s like (1) I’ve tried to,
in some cases, even exaggerate a little but just to make them take notice
but, you know, it’s so frustrating you know you walk away thinking ‘Why
the fuck (2) did I go in there in the first place? Why did I reveal all those
personal things about myself and my family if they’re not going to be
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DJ: Do you feel able to talk about Brian, to either friends, colleagues …
ML: Only my sister …
DJ: You don’t talk to other people?
ML: No… (1)
DJ: Why is that?
ML: … I don’t have any friends … I only have my colleagues here at work,
because I involve myself in my family (2). I find contentment with my
family. I don’t need to go out and find someone to talk to because I
involve myself with my family . . . 
A little later on in the interview I pushed the point about her perhaps
feeling that stigma has affected her, and she denies it on the grounds
that she does not bother trying to discuss mental sickness with anyone
(except for someone similarly affected):
DJ: Do you think, maybe, that the difficulties with Brian made you more
private?
ML: No I was always a quiet person … although I’m happy go lucky – I’ll walk
around the office and I’ll sing and I can talk to people and I can discuss
my family with them … but when it comes to discussing a sickness, a
mental sickness I feel that people don’t understand, because they type
them … Unless that person is actually experienced themselves, there is a
girl here she had a nervous breakdown, she knows what it feels like, she
has a brother-in-law he had a mental breakdown from drink.
Occasionally I talk to her about Brian because she understands, but I
wouldn’t discuss it with … I found the person that I am able to talk to, so
I am able to talk to her.
When I yet again tried to ask her more directly about any possible
feelings of being stigmatised (3) Mrs Land became quite hostile in
denying any experience like this. She certainly seemed to perceive my
questions as aggressive. In fact I was aware that I did become quite
defensive and almost confrontational at this point. After the interview
I had to think hard about what had happened here and consider what
the counter-transference issues were. It was certainly unusual (I think,
unique) for me to get into a confrontation with the people I was inter-
viewing – who I was normally allowing to ‘tell their own story’. I might
have had some reason to be confrontational, perhaps annoyed that Mrs
Land was not agreeing with me about my idea about the significance of
stigma. I think instead that we did act out something about her rela-
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people for example, because when he gets into a very, very bad condition
people begin to think that there are traces of you . . . of him in you as well
(7) When they open the door they look at you very closely to see how you
look: – are you looking aggressive today or not?! … I mean it’s like little
subtleties. .[edit] I’m not saying it happens on a large, or overt scale but
you can see that they seem to think that there is a weak chain in all the
sort of image that you project . (8) Strong, confident whatever. Because
obviously for your brother to be in that condition means that you can’t
be as strong as all that. In that you do have a problem deep down (9) as
well and some people want you to talk about it, but you don’t want to . . .
Jason feels that his own identity is very directly threatened by his
brother’s condition. Jason is aware of the dilemma that he needs the
support of others, but is becoming more reluctant to seek that support
because of the threat to his identity that such exposure entails. The
next example is someone who, I argue, has been deeply affected by
shame which has helped to keep her in a highly unresolved grief. 
2. Shame and Withdrawal from Dialogue
Mrs Land was in her late 50s and her son, who had been in and out of
hospital with severe mental health problems since his late teens, was in
his early 30s. I will suggest here that Mrs Land is very affected by
feelings of shame yet is not able to acknowledge them at all. It was
through analysis of my own reactions during the interview (the
counter-transference) that I was led to an understanding of the
powerful impact of shame. I argue here that shame was manifest during
the interview itself, so that dialogue about her son was severely limited.
This formulation of the impact of shame on the dialogue is, I suggest,
not merely relevant for understanding the interview itself, but could
also be construed as operating in the rest of her life. There was evidence
that she had withdrawn more generally from any kind of dialogue
about her son. This makes it difficult for her to reach any new under-
standing of her son’s current condition. Instead, she is stuck with her
memories of him as a healthy and successful child and teenager, which
do not connect with how her son is now. This means it is hard for her
to have a real relationship with her son. At the time of interview she
had not visited him in hospital for over 6 months. 
When I first tried to broach the subject of stigma, the dialogue
between us quickly became attenuated (1), but Mrs Land instead talked
of not needing other people since she withdraws into her family (2): 
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that Mrs Land felt more comfortable in this territory. Mrs Land made
reference to having ‘tape recordings’ of her son (5) as a child. This
otherwise odd reference seems to express how the memory of Brian as
a child is trapped as an isolated memory in her mind. These memories
are not connected to how Brian developed as a teenager and then an
adult, or who he is currently. I was given a list of his past achievements: 
DJ: Did he use to be very different?
ML: Oh yes I’ve got tape recordings of him as a child (5), he was so happy go
lucky, joking and he’s very, very talented. He taught himself to play the
guitar; he’s even written his own music. And he went for exams to play
guitar, he was disillusioned because he put himself up at such a level that
was too high for him, he graded himself to a grade seven, in fact he was
probably a grade five. He went for music lessons, he went. He was
working. He was working up at [a shopping centre] he was an electrician.
He qualified as an electrician within three years rather than five. And yet
he was not interested in his school but he qualified as an electrician after
16, and he wrote this music. He even took music lessons with [guitarist],
you’ve heard of him? … So he’s not stupid, not a stupid boy, he’s very,
very sensitive. 
The next question addressed the present (6), which was more problem-
atic for Mrs Land. Although her son is in his 30s, Mrs Land seemed to
be describing a relationship a mother would expect to have with a
young child. She takes him out shopping and buys him some clothes as
he became like his old self (7) – rather like a child in asking ‘Now what
shall we do now mum?’(7). 
DJ: So he does talk to you now? (6)
ML: Yeh. Uh, I went to see him and all he would say was “yes, no, I’m alright,
don’t worry about me”, for several weeks and then I arranged to take him
out and buy him some clothes and I took him to the shop and all he
wanted was a pair of shoes (6). I took him to the shop and bought him
these trainers and when he came out of there for a brief moment he was
his old self (7), “Now what shall we do now mum?”, I said “Well what
would you like to do?” And he said, “Oh I don’t know anything you’d like
to do”, so he was back to his old self with me, alone… 
Perhaps this remained an unresolved situation because there has been
a major rupture in the narrative that Mrs Land has about herself and
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tionship to her son and to the outside world. Briefly in the interview I
did become part of the hostile world that she thinks cannot understand
and care for her son. I become part of the hostile world that she shelters
from. To an extent, this could be seen as an example of ‘projective iden-
tification’ (Bollas, 1987; Hinshelwood, 1989). Perhaps Mrs Land has
projected the hostile feelings that she has about her son onto me, and I
have responded by helping her to act out this split – she has good
thoughts about her son whilst I, and the rest of the world, have bad
ones. At the end of the extract, I think that some of the anxiety and
shame that Mrs Land struggles with emerged (4) as she brings up the
possibility that others might see her son as a ‘loony’: 
DJ: Do you think people might look at you differently (3) …
ML: No.
DJ: if you told them about Brian?
ML: No. It doesn’t bother me. To me mental sickness, and any illness, is an
illness to me.
DJ: But I know other people say, they think other people will look at them
differently, that others will look down on them?
ML: No. No. I don’t feel that at all, I’m proud of my son. 
DJ: I know you are, but I’m just saying that I know other people have said to
me that they are reluctant to talk to friends and colleagues about their
son or daughter because they think that they will be looked down on. 
ML: No. You see I feel confident enough that if I spoke to anyone about
my son I’m able to get across to them. Whereas there wouldn’t be any
of that, I don’t believe that people would think that, because I know
my own ability that when I start talking to someone they were able to
understand. It’s just the same to me as explaining to someone how to
mend broken bones if I knew how to do it, and that’s how I talk to
people… I’ve never found anyone yet, haven’t met anyone yet who’s
been biased. I mean you hear about it, but I’ve never met anyone. And
I feel that if I did meet somebody that I would talk them around it, so
that they would understand, so I don’t feel that someone’s going to
think my son’s a loony (4), in layman’s language, so it doesn’t bother
me.
I suggest that shame was being revealed through this confrontation,
and that shame was keeping Mrs Land out of dialogue with me and
perhaps anyone else (she suggests in the interview that she does not
talk to anyone). The next question referred her to the past and it is clear
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after him. It is a stigma yes it is.
CP: Mmm. I find actually myself, I will talk more freely than I did, I have to
say, I suppose because after so many years of going through what we’ve
gone through you accept it (2). And it’s just a fact of life, it’s there. And
so … yes I do talk abut it freely, but I think with certain people you can
see a look cross their face because they’re not made aware of it, it’s not
something that you know there isn’t a hell of a lot of publicity about it.
MP: Well we didn’t know anything about it let’s face it.
CP: No we didn’t, we didn’t know anything about it, but also it’s not. It’s not
the sort of thing that’s trendy to be part of. Do you know what I mean? I
can’t explain it, it’s just…
MP: AIDS is of course (3).
CP: Everybody is going on about how ghastly AIDS is.
MP: It is ghastly.
CP: It is ghastly, people are dying of it, but people are also dying … 
MP: Six hundred million pounds was given to AIDS at the last … 
CP: The trendy charity, everybody is giving to, doing something for AIDS
and nobody is doing anything for, let’s face it, an illness which has been
around for centuries. AIDS has just only come into being, I mean you
know … 
So the reference to AIDS suggests that this family is not free of feelings
of shame and anger. Despite the presence of these feelings, this family
seemed to represent one of the more resolved situations that were
encountered during the study. This can be understood as a function of
their ability to come to terms with their feelings of shame and to have
thus worked further through a process of grief. They have been able to
do this by creating a dialogue between themselves and Donald which is
able to accommodate their memories about the past, their feelings of
loss and shame, alongside an understanding of the current situation. It
was striking that the capacity for dialogue was very evident during the
interview itself. Of course there were two of them in this interview
which may well have helped put them at their ease and be able to talk.
Nonetheless I still think that there was evidence of a very constructive
dialogue actively going on during the interview. They were batting
ideas around, certainly not agreeing with each other or me all the time.
We had all, I think, reached a rather different understanding of things
by the end of the dialogue. 
I had noticed the word acceptance being used earlier in the interview
(as in 2, in the above extract). As I was wondering if some sort of
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her relationship with her son. She is not able to renegotiate a different
narrative, so she is confined in a somewhat unreal relationship with her
son where it is difficult for her to construe him as anything other than
a little boy. It is as though his childhood is stuck on audio-tape, and
there is no connection between these memories and the adult Brian
who has a lot of problems. There seems to be no meaningful framework
in which this can be understood. The stifling effect of shame was very
evident even during the interview itself. It is serving to keep Mrs Land
out of dialogue with anyone about Brian as he was now. 
An interview with a family where feelings of shame have not
obstructed dialogue will now be presented. It is argued that this process
of dialogue, which was very alive during the interview, has been
instrumental in facilitating relationships between family members
(including the person with mental health difficulties).
3. Dialogue and the Renegotiation of the Narrative 
Mrs Peters was in her 60s and had a son who had had a diagnosis of
schizophrenia for over 20 years. She was talking here with her
daughter Carol Peters. When they were asked about stigma, they
were quite unusual in talking quite freely about having felt stigma-
tized. Mrs Peters told me first of all that she experiences stigma
within the family (1). To other members of the family it is as though
Donald had disappeared from the story of her family. Carol talks
about feeling stigmatized in the past and suggests that her own
‘acceptance’ of the situation has reduced her own feelings of being
stigmatized (2). Mother and daughter then go on to make bitter
contrast between the large amount of publicity and funding that
AIDS has received with the attention given to mental illness. The
link that was made here to AIDS (3), with its associations to sexu-
ality, death and shame (Kaufman 1989) is surely poignant. This
angry aside perhaps does indicate a certain amount of ‘splitting’
(Klein 1946) which Alexander et al. (1999) suggest is characteristic
of shame experiences. Some of the anger and ambivalence that Carol
and her mother may feel towards Donald, is safely channelled to an
external target – AIDS. 
DJ: Yes. Often people have difficulty talking outside of the family.
MP: Yes that is quite true, it is still a terrible stigma, there is no doubt about
that. I mean I have aunts and things who never mention his name (1).
They never ask after him, they ask after the girls, but they will never ask
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It needs to be emphasised that this process of dialogue has not eradi-
cated distressing feelings about what has happened. It has instead
allowed the unhappiness to be talked about and to become part of the
shared narrative of their family. They have their memories of the past
when he was a child and well, and they recognise that they have lost
something: 
CP: It’s like a terminal illness of any kind really. You know its like coping
with somebody that’s in a wheel chair. One of your children lives in a
wheel chair.
MP: As far as I’m concerned I think about him all the time. 
CP: Well you think, like all of us, when we think about. When you think
about your family you think about the four of us, you don’t think about
Donald being somewhere else, you just think about all of us as a unit.
And er… I mean …you know my sister and I we sort of. We … I suppose
at the beginning you think ‘My god I’ve lost a brother’ because that’s
what it feels like.
MP: In fact you have lost him when he’s ill
CP: When he’s ill, I mean totally, he’s just not there.
MP: … he’s not the same at all.
CP: You know there’s the three of you as children and you’ve all grown up
together, you’ve all gone to school together … all of a sudden he’s not
there because he’s just. It’s a completely different person it’s not the
Donald that you know. And as I say you have to accept it in some form
or another, [edit] … It’s just a life-long thing really. I mean I think we’re
all resigned to the fact that this is going to go on for all of our lives and
[sigh] we will have to cope with things as and when they come up . . . And
it will never be the family that it was, ever again.
There were two of them, which might have made talking easier for
them (compared to Mrs Land in the previous example). Despite this, it
still seems clear that mother and daughter were able to engage in a very
lively dialogue with me about their feelings of being stigmatized, and
their feelings of loss. They tell me they that they think an important
turning point in their being able to work out a liveable arrangement
with Donald was when he and they were able to have a dialogue about
the way he was. I think that this capacity for dialogue has been very
important in their being able reach a more reconciled place, a place not
free of the unhappiness and loss, but where there is space for the real
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psychological process of ‘acceptance’ was of significance I commented
on this (4). The suggestion was greeted with scepticism (5). It was felt
that Donald’s own acceptance (6) was more important, and that what
was really crucial was that he was able to talk about it (7) – he became
involved with them in a process of dialogue:
DJ: It sounds as though your accepting of him becoming somewhat different
has been important in being able to cope (4).
CP: Um … yeh. I don’t know, I suppose so … Because not that it’s important
(5), I just think that is something that you have to do, it’s not that it’s
important I just think …
MP: It was when he accepted it, that it was a great milestone, when he
accepted that he was ill (6), he didn’t for a long time . . .
CP: Yes that’s right … He did not. One’s been through so much that… there’s
so much that’s gone through and you tend to feel … ‘well at what stage
did you accept it?’ And I suppose one accepted it when he accepted it. It
was a big thing for all of us.
DJ: What happened then?
CP: Nothing. He just started talking about it openly (7). 
MP: Talking about it openly which he never did before, and he wouldn’t
accept that there was anything wrong with him.
CP: You know he kept saying that … 
MP: ‘It was all rubbish, everyone was’ … I can’t remember. The doctors were
making it all up…’
CP: Yes, that ‘they were victimising him and that work were victimising him,
the company were victimising him, they wanted to put him somewhere
where they wouldn’t have to look at him’, and all this sort of thing. It was
all sorts … Everybody else. And then all of a sudden he just started
talking about … the hospital and the fact that he couldn’t work and he
knew he couldn’t work. 
MP: And never will work.
CP: And never will work and that really one’s got to look at it like he were an
invalid. Remember that, when he was going on about “really I’m an
invalid” …
MP: Mmmm. Well he does get a disability pension.
CP: Yes. He wasn’t going on about the pension but he was going about the fact
that he was an invalid.
MP: Well he was quite pleased about that!
CP: Yes. You see this is the thing, you know he’s still our brother and that’s
all there is really.
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substantial methodological issue I would want to raise is that shame
cannot be properly studied without a psycho-social research method-
ology like the one used here. On the other hand, shame cannot be fully
understood without greater study of both the psychological and the
social aspects of the phenomenon. 
Shame and Grief 
The argument has been made that the shame that was tangibly inter-
fering with dialogue during the interviews could also be having an
impact on someone’s ability to use dialogue in other contexts. As
discussed in the introduction, there are a number of strands of thought
emphasising the importance of dialogue and interaction to the experi-
ence of selfhood (Harré, 1998; Stern, 1998; Schafer, 1992). People’s
sense of themselves can be constantly replenished by continuing inter-
action with others. This might be particularly important during
periods of loss. New dialogues can create fresh narratives, which them-
selves might encourage processes of adjustment to loss and change. If
shame disrupts those dialogues and interferes with the process of
creating new narratives, this would help explain the widely noted
phenomenon of ‘chronic grief ’ amongst families affected by serious
mental illness. It may be that longer-term research tracing how
people’s feelings of shame and grief changed over time might help tease
out some of the causal factors and the importance of individual differ-
ences and contexts (such as the presence of social support or previous
biographical experiences). 
It may also be useful to think about the more general links that have
been made between shame and depression (Tangey, 1993; Andrews,
Qian, and Valentine, 2002). The long term work of George Brown and
colleagues on the significance of experiences of loss in the aetiology of
depression has drawn attention to the significance of loss events that
have also involved experiences of humiliation (Brown, 1998; Craig,
1996). These finding have been framed within an evolutionary model
that emphasises the loss of rank and status (Gilbert, 1998). The frame-
work used in this study suggests a somewhat different explanation –
where shame itself may have a corrosive effect on the dialogue that is
required for people to build different meanings for themselves after
loss. Experiences of humiliation would be very likely to give rise to
these feelings of shame (indeed the distinction is debatable, Patterson
2000). There may also be useful theoretical links to be made here with
cognitive models of depression that emphasise the rather negative and
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person of Donald.
Discussion
Shame is a good example of an important phenomenon that cannot
readily be studied through conventional methods. Shame exists in the
psycho-social space created between the intimate world of feeling and
that of culture. As feelings of shame grow and impact on people, they are
unlikely to be able to report on it (Tantam, 1998). Instead shame
emerges in more covert ways in the interpersonal space between people.
Research techniques that are sensitive to unconscious dynamics, that
allow one to search beneath the overt communications, are therefore
called for. The technique used in this study wedded certain psychody-
namic assumptions and techniques to more conventional qualitative
interviewing (as discussed by Hollway and Jefferson, 2000 and Jones,
1998). Such techniques allow researchers to apprehend aspects of
people’s experiences that they may be unwilling or unable to discuss. Of
course, such techniques depend on highly subjective processes of inter-
pretation. Questions can quite rightly be asked about the validity of
such findings. It seems to me that it is crucial that researchers are
honest and open about how the interview material was gathered and the
premises used to reach these conclusions (Elliott, Fischer and Rennie,
1999). After all, the presence of shame raises challenges not only to
quantitative methods, but also to those qualitative methods that rely on
people being able to report their experiences directly (Andrews, 1998). 
Of course other important objections to the methodological issues
raised here can be made. Even if it is accepted that shame has been
detected within the psycho-social space of the interview, significant
questions can still be raised as to the sources of that shame. Those with
different theoretical perspectives may want to search in very different
places. The psychoanalytically inclined may well see the important
sources of shame within the biography of the individuals themselves
(Chasseguet-Smirgel, 1985), the more sociologically minded might
wonder about the impact of gender and ethnicity on the particular
encounter. Indeed the shame arising in an interview may well be the
very particular product of the encounter. The interaction (and clashes)
of personalities, fantasies, experiences, ethnicities and genders of the
interviewer and interviewee may well be conspiring to produce shame
in that context, such that caution must be applied to generalising
outside of the interview. Whilst these are undoubtedly legitimate
issues, they of course arise in many social research endeavours. The
86 critical psychology
symptoms with a new measure of shame: The Experience of Shame Scale.’
British Journal of Clinical Psychology. Volume 41 pp. 29–42. 
Atkinson, S. D (1994). ‘Grieving and Loss in parents with a schizophrenic
child.’ American Journal of Psychiatry. Volume 151 pp. 1137–39.
Beck, A. Rush A.J., Shaw, B.F., and Emery, G (1979). Cognitive Therapy of
Depression. New York. Basic Books.
Berger, P. L. and Luckman, T. (1967). The Social Construction of Reality: a treatise
in the sociology of knowledge. Harmondsworth. Penguin. 
Bogdan, R and Taylor, S. J (1975). Introduction to qualitative methods: A phenom-
enological Approach to the social sciences. New York. Wiley.
Bollas, C (1987). The Shadow of the Object. London. Free Association Books. 
Bonanno, G. A. and Kaltman, S (1999). ‘Toward and Integrative Perspective on
Bereavement.’ Psychological Bulletin. Volume 125 (6) pp. 760–76.
Broucek, F. J (1982). “Shame and its Relationship to Early Narcissistic
Developments.” International Journal of Psychoanalysis. Volume 63 pp.
369–78.
Brown, G. W (1998). ‘Genetic and population perspectives on life events and
depression.’ Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology. Volume 33 pp.
363-372.
Bruner, J (1990). Acts of Meaning. Cambridge, MA. Harvard University Press. 
Casement, P (1985). On Learning from the Patient. London. Tavistock Publications
Casement, P (1989). On Further Learning from the Patient. London. Tavistock
Publications. 
Chassegeut-Smirgel, J (1985). The Ego-Ideal. London. Free Association Books.
Craib, I (1995). ‘Some Comments on the Sociology of the Emotions.’ Sociology
Volume 29 (1) pp. 151–58.
Craig, T, T, J. (1996). ‘Adversity and Depression.’ International Review of
Psychiatry Volume 8 (4) p. 341.
Creer, C. (1975) ‘Living With Schizophrenia.’ Social Work Today . Volume 6 (1)
p. 2–7.
Davis, D. and Schultz (1997) ‘Grief, Parenting, and Schizophrenia.’ Social
Science and Medicine. Volume 46 (3) pp. 369–379.
Elliott, R., Fischer, C. and Rennie, D.L (1999). ‘Evolving guidelines for publi-
cation of qualitative research studies in psychology and related fields.’
British Journal of Psychology. Volume 38 pp. 215–29.
Giddens, A (1991). Modernity and Self-Identity. Cambridge. Polity Press. 
Gilbert, P (1998). ‘What is shame? Some Core Issues and Controversies.’ In
Gilbert and Andrews (Eds.) Shame: Interpersonal Psychopthology, and Culture.
Oxford. Oxford University Press. 
Gilbert, P. and McGuire, M. T (1998) ‘Shame, status, and social roles:
Psychobiology and Evolution’. In Gilbert and Andrews (Eds.) Shame:
Interpersonal Psychopthology, and Culture. Oxford. Oxford University Press. 
Glaser, B. G and Straus, A (1967). On The Discovery of Grounded Theory. London.
Weidenfield and Nicholson. 
Goffman, E (1963). Stigma: notes on the management of spoiled identity.
Harmondsworth. Penguin. 
shame and loss 89
circular thought processes that are associated with depression (Beck,
Rush, Shaw and Emery, 1979). These thought processes may well be
self perpetuating if they are not being challenged through dialogue.
Such thinking fits with ideas on the need for reconstructive cognitive
work following losses and traumas. Walter (1996) emphasises the
significance of dialogue to the bereavement process (see also Bonanno
and Kaltman, 1999, who argue for the importance of dialogue in ‘cogni-
tive reconstruction’ following loss). If shame does have such an
inhibitory impact on dialogue then it is understandable how it could
interfere with processes of adjustment following loss and change.
Without an ability to update the narrative of their lives, people might
well be left stranded in a state of depression. 
Notes
1. For reasons discussed about the difficulty that people may have in
discussing shame, their reliance on data from self-report questionnaires
might be seen as undermining the robustness of the findings.
2. This was to ensure that the sample consisted of families who had a member
suffering from serious and long-term mental illness, but whose lives were
being led largely in the community. It is this group who have been identi-
fied as providing a significant challenge for the successful implementation
of community care policy.
3. See Casement (1985, 1989) and Malan (1979) for discussions of theory and
technique, and Klauber (1981) for methodological discussion of psycho-
analysis. 
4. The sexual and coprolitic language is open to psychoanalytic interpretation
in terms of possible infantile roots of shame, connected to experiences of
toilet training and body shame (Chasseguet-Smirgel, 1985). 
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